

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

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ABSTRACT

of the dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

**THE MODERN MODELS OF THE PRESIDENCY
INSTITUTION**

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH

Relevance and Degree of Research of the Topic. The institution of the presidency is one of the key elements for understanding how public administration functions. This is because the executive branch represents the principal center directing the day-to-day activities of the state apparatus, and the president stands at the head of this center. Public administrators must take into account that adopted decisions are not limited to legal texts alone; rather, they are implemented through specific political priorities and governance mechanisms. Therefore, understanding how the presidency is organized, through which stages decisions are formed, and how the presidential administration influences the state apparatus is of particular importance from the perspective of governance. In the sphere of practical public administration, the activities of civil servants are often directly linked to the political directions determined by the president. A significant portion of state programs, social projects, economic initiatives, and institutional reforms originates from the political agenda of the executive branch. For example, decisions such as the adoption of a new economic strategy or the expansion of a social welfare program do not remain merely political statements. Subsequently, these decisions are transformed into concrete action plans implemented by various ministries and state institutions. At this stage, public administrators become the key actors responsible for implementing these decisions. Understanding the essence and operational principles of the institution of the presidency enables civil servants to accurately assess which initiatives are prioritized, which policy directions receive political support, and which sectors of the state apparatus are allocated greater resources.

On the other hand, the implementation of public policy is not limited to the activities of a single institution. Modern public administration requires coordination among numerous ministries, agencies, and local governance structures. For example, energy policy is not solely the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy. The process also involves institutions responsible for the economy,

finance, foreign policy, and even environmental regulation. Such a complex coordination mechanism is often structured on the basis of the overall political direction formulated by the presidential administration. The study of the institution of the presidency is also important for understanding the relationships among the various branches of state power. Examining the mechanisms through which these relationships are established helps to explain how the system of checks and balances within the state is formed. A healthy political system emerges precisely as a result of the proper functioning of these balancing mechanisms.

For this reason, public administrators who understand how the institution of the presidency functions are able to comprehend these institutional relationships more clearly and organize coordination among various institutions more effectively. In this respect, the study of the presidency is important not only for understanding the technical aspects of the governance process but also for evaluating the outcomes of public policy. Public administrators take part in determining the extent to which implemented programs are effective. For example, issues such as the real impact of social assistance programs, the results of economic incentive packages, or the effectiveness of regional development projects constitute an essential part of this evaluation process.

In many countries, the institution of the presidency is regarded as one of the principal pillars that safeguard the stability of the political system. The president often acts as a figure who maintains balance among various political forces and determines the general direction of state policy. For this reason, examining how the institution of the presidency functions makes it possible to more clearly identify the strengths and weaknesses of a political system. By comparing the experiences of different countries, researchers can determine which governance mechanisms are more effective and draw conclusions about the models most suitable for the development of democratic governance. The existence of the presidency in different forms also makes the study of this topic both more interesting and more significant. In various political systems around the world, the role and powers of the president are not

identical. In countries such as the United States, the president serves as the chief head of the executive branch and directly directs the day-to-day activities of the government. In contrast, in some countries the president functions primarily as a figure who maintains political balance and acts as a symbolic representative of the state. In large states such as Russia, China, and India, the form and powers of the presidency are closely linked to the political traditions and governance models of those countries. These differences demonstrate that the institution of the presidency should not be viewed as a single universal model but rather as an institutional mechanism that adapts to different political systems.

The study of contemporary models of the presidency is also of particular significance for our country. This is because the political system of the Republic of Azerbaijan is based on a presidential model, and the key decisions in public administration are implemented primarily through the executive branch. For this reason, examining how the institution of the presidency functions in different countries is not only of theoretical interest but also makes it possible to draw practical conclusions for Azerbaijan. The study of these different models allows Azerbaijan to evaluate international experience from a broader perspective. Such a comparative approach is not intended merely to accumulate theoretical knowledge. On the contrary, such research helps to identify the areas in which the existing system functions more effectively and those in which further improvement is needed. In order to enhance the efficiency of public administration, the organizational structure of the presidency, the procedures of decision-making, and its relations with various state institutions can be analyzed more clearly. This, in turn, contributes to the formation of more flexible governance mechanisms within the functioning of the state apparatus.

The relevance of the research does not end here; the study of presidential models also makes it possible to conduct international comparisons. This means that examining the governance practices of different countries helps to identify examples that may be beneficial for Azerbaijan. For instance, issues such as increasing transparency in the formulation of public policy, ensuring a more open evaluation

of the activities of the executive branch, and strengthening the accountability of state institutions to society become more evident through such comparative analyses. The study of successful governance practices in other countries also provides Azerbaijan with an opportunity to consider new institutional approaches.

Thus, the relevance of this research direction can be summarized in three main points:

- Since the institution of the presidency represents one of the principal organizational centers of the executive branch in modern public administration, understanding its operational mechanisms is of particular importance for explaining how the state apparatus functions. Studying the decision-making mechanisms of this institution, its organizational structure, and its influence on the formation of state policy allows for a more precise analysis of the practical functioning of public administration.

- The fact that the institution of the presidency operates in different models across various countries makes it necessary to conduct comparative political analyses in this field. Examining the strengths and weaknesses of different presidential systems helps to provide a clearer understanding of how relations between the branches of state power and the mechanisms of checks and balances are formed.

- Since the political system of the Republic of Azerbaijan is also based on the presidential model, studying the contemporary forms of this institution is of practical significance for the country. A comparative analysis of the experiences of different countries makes it possible to evaluate existing governance mechanisms and to derive scientific conclusions aimed at their further improvement.

To understand the theoretical foundations of modern presidential models, particular importance should be given to the approaches formed around the principle of the separation of powers in the history of political thought. This principle was initially proposed in ancient Greek political philosophy by Plato and Aristotle, and was later further developed in ancient Roman political-legal thought by Polybius. In the early Middle Ages, the issue of the source and legitimacy of power was discussed by Marsilius of Padua,

which created the basis for the more systematic formation of the idea of the separation of powers. This concept was first elaborated in a fundamental and systematic manner by John Locke and was later institutionalized by Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, who conceptually substantiated the division of authority among the branches of government and the mechanism of “checks and balances.” Montesquieu’s approach had a direct influence on the formation of the state model of the United States and was further applied and developed within a concrete political system by Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. In the nineteenth century, this intellectual tradition was interpreted from various perspectives in the works of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In the twentieth century, the problems of the executive branch and the functional organization of power were examined in a deeper social and institutional context by Max Weber, Michel Foucault, and Alexis de Tocqueville. In the contemporary period, researchers such as Paul Craig and Adam Tomkins, David Dyzenhaus, Albert Venn Dicey, Tom Campbell, Bert A. Rockman, and Joel D. Aberbach have made significant contributions to expanding the theoretical framework of presidential models by examining the structural characteristics of executive institutions, their legal foundations, and their role within the political system.

The works listed above are regarded as important theoretical contributions in the history of global political science. Nevertheless, the institution of the presidency has also been sufficiently analyzed from a theoretical perspective in Azerbaijan. In the book published in 1994 by Sh. Aliyev, the institution of the presidency is examined as a central element of public administration, and its organizational structure, scope of authority, and role within the political system are explained in a systematic manner. The author primarily focuses on the legal foundations and functional characteristics of the institution, providing a theoretical justification of the presidency’s role in the formation of state policy¹.

¹ Əliyev, Ş. Prezidentlik institutu / Ş.Əliyev. – Bakı: Bakı Universiteti. – 1994. – 115 s.

In A.Guliyev's study, which is based on a comparative analysis of the Republics of Ukraine and Azerbaijan, the institution of the presidency is examined through a comparative legal approach within the context of international security, particularly in the framework of combating terrorism. By comparing the legislative practices of the respective countries, the author analyzes the legal mechanisms of presidential authority in this sphere and evaluates their effectiveness.²

In V.Bagirli's dissertation, the institution of the presidency is examined from a comparative legal perspective using the examples of Azerbaijan and the United States, and the structural and functional differences between the two models are identified. The study systematically analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of different governance models through an examination of presidential powers, relations with the branches of government, and institutional characteristics.³

In our country, the problem of the separation of powers, its theoretical and methodological aspects, as well as various dimensions of presidential authority have also been examined in the works of V.Jafarov, Sh.Aliyev, J.Hasanov, N.Ibrahimov, K.Musayev, F.Nagiyev, E.Novruzov, V.Omerov, A.Rzayev, and N.Shukurov⁴.

² Гулиев, А. Институт президентства в противодействии международному терроризму: сравнительно-правовой анализ законодательств Украины и Азербайджанской Республики / А.Гулиев. – Киев: НАУ, – 2012. – 438 с.

³ Bağırılı, V.D. Azərbaycan Respublikasında və ABŞ-da prezidentlik institutu (müqayisəli-hüquqi tədqiqat): / hüquq üzrə fəlsəfə doktoru dissertasiyanın avtoreferatı / – Bakı, 2014, – 25 s.

⁴ Cəfərov, V. Hüquqi dövlətdə hakimiyyət bölgüsü // Ekspress. – 2016. 27 dekabr.; Əliyev, Ş. Prezidentlik institutu / Ş.Əliyev. – Bakı: Bakı Universiteti. – 1994. – 115 s.; Həsənov, C. Azərbaycanda Prezidentlik institutunun tarixi və kökləri haqqında düşüncələr // – Bakı: Təhsilimiz, – 2003. N 3, – s.13-15.; İbrahimov, N. Prezidentli və parlamentli respublikalarda prezidentliyin əsas xüsusiyyətləri // – Bakı: Dövlət idarəçiliyi: nəzəriyyə və təcrübə. – 2018. N 64, – s.237-245.; Musayev, K.İ. Hakimiyyətin bölünməsi konsepsiyası və prezidentlik institutunun yaranması // – Bakı: Elmi məcmuələr. Milli Aviasiya Akademiyası, – 2012. N 4, – s.53-57.; Nağıyev, F. Konstitusiyada dəyişikliklər hakimiyyət qolları arasında tarazlığın təmin olunmasına xidmət edir // Xalq qəzeti. – 2016, 11 sentyabr. – s.3.; Novruzov, E.M. Müstəqil Azərbaycan Respublikasında prezidentlik institutunun formalaşması // – Bakı: Elmi məcmuələr. Milli Aviasiya Akademiyası. – 2015. N 1, – s.113-114.; Ömərov, V. Hüquqi dövlət və prezidentlik institutu // Səs qəzeti. – 2011, 22 sentyabr.

In recent years, the development of the institution of the presidency in the brotherly country of Turkey has attracted particular scholarly interest. This is largely connected with the transformations that have taken place in Turkey's political system over the past decade. The issue of the presidency in Turkey has been examined in the works of S.Akdemir, B.Alkan, S.Altınkök, M.Benli, A.Çapar, Ö.Çelebi, Ö.Çelik, C.Demirkaya, M.Duyar, M.Erdoğan, O.Cansız, M.Göç, C.Gül, M.Işık, H.Kaçanoğlu, M.Köçyegit, M.Özkan, A.Ünal and others⁵.

– s.10.; Rzaev, Ə. ABŞ konstitusiyasının formalaşması zaman və məkan kontekstində // – Bakı: Dövlət idarəçiliyi: nəzəriyyə və təcrübə, – 2013. – s.5-6.

⁵ Akdemir, S. Kuvvetler Ayrılığına Yenilikçi Bir Bakış: Dörtlü Kuvvet Önerisi // İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi, – 2019. 8 (1), – s.685-710.; Alkan, B.N. 1982 Anayasası çerçevesinde Cumhurbaşkanının sorumsuzluğu / B.N.Alkan. – Mersin: Çağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2022. – 254 s.; Altınkök, S. Constrained Parliamentarism Versus Semipresidentialism in the Context of the Principle of the Separation of Powers // Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, – 2015. 15(3), – p.179-200.; Benli, M.D. Kuvvetler ayrılığı prensibinin temel hak ve özgürlüklerin korunmasındaki işlevi / M.D.Benli. – İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. – 2021. – 180 s.; Çapar, A. Yargı Bağımsızlığı Ekseninde Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sisteminde Yürütme ve Yargı İlişkisi // İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, – 2022. 13(1), – s.148-165.; Çelebi, Ö. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde Başkanın Kararname Çıkarma Yetkisi // Çankırı Karatekin Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, – 2022. 13(1), – s.179-190.; Çelik, Ö. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hukukunda Yürütme İmtiyazı // Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, – 2022. 30(3), – s.1253-1299.; Demirkaya, C. Başkanlık sistemi ve yarı başkanlık sistemi analizi: ABD ve Fransa örneği / C.Demirkaya. – İstanbul: Nişantaşı Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2017. – 184 s.; Duyar, M. Kuvvetler ayrılığı ve siyasal istikrar ilişkisi / M.Duyar. – Sakarya: Sakarya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2011. – 197 s.; Erdoğan, M. Başkanlık sistemi ve parlamenter sistemdeki krizler neticesinde ortaya çıkan yeni Türk tipi başkanlık sistemi /M.Erdoğan. – Niğde: Niğde Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2019. – 199 s.; Cansız, O. The powers and functions of the Congress in the United States Presidential system / O.Cansız. – İstanbul: Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü, – 2022. – 154 p.; Göç, M. Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sistemi ve ABD başkanlık sisteminde yürütmeye yardımcı organların karşılaştırmalı analizi / M.Göç. – Van: Van Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2022. – 187 s.; Gül, C. Çağdaş Siyasal Rejimlerde Etkin Yürütme Olgusu/ C.Gül, K.Karagöz // – Ankara: Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, – 2007. 11(1), – s.711-

In neighboring Russia as well, there is a considerable body of research devoted to the institution of the presidency. Scholars such as O.Belyayeva, A.Bersenev and A.Miroshnichenko, O.Grishayeva, V.Yegorov, O.Zaznayev, O.Zuykov, M.Mejidovna, S.Parechina, M.Farukshin, and M.Shugart and M.Carey have examined various aspects of the presidency⁶.

752.; Işık, M. Hukuk devleti bağlamında Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sisteminin kuvvetler ayrılığı açısından bir değerlendirmesi / M.Işık. – İstanbul: Aksaray Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2023. – 221 s.; Kaçanoğlu, H. Türkiye'de yeni cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sistemi: başkanlık, yarı başkanlık ve parlamenter sistem üzerine karşılaştırmalı bir analiz / H.Kaçanoğlu. – Kırşehir: Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2022. – 169 s.; Koçyeğit, M. Azerbaycan ve Türkiye başkanlık sistemlerinin karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmesi / M.Koçyeğit. – Antalya: Akdeniz Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2021. – 192 s.; Özkan, M. Başkanlık sisteminde başkanın statüsü ve yetkileri / M.Özkan. – Ankara: Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, – 2017. – 150 s.; Ünal, H. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sisteminin Yürütme Erki Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi // Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, – 2021. 2(26), – s.225-246.

⁶ Беляева, О.М. Теория разделения властей и концепция неотчуждаемых (естественных) прав человека через призму учения Дж. Локка // История государства и права. – 2017. № 18, – с. 3-8.; Берсенева, А.А. Становление и развитие теории разделения властей/ А.А.Берсенева, А.В.Мирошниченко // International Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences, – 2022. vol. 5-2 (68), – с. 220-225.; Гришаева, О.Н. Сценарии развития института президентства // Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология и искусствоведение. Вопросы теории и практики, – 2014. N 2-1(40), – с. 51-53.; Егоров, В.Г. Президентализм и парламентаризм в политических системах новых независимых государств // Политическая наука и современное общество: сб. науч. тр. / под ред. В.Г. Егорова. – Москва: ИИУ МГОУ, – 2013. Вып. 4, – с. 4-25.; Зазнаев, О.И. Модели контролируемой передачи президентской власти/ О.И.Зазнаев, В.В.Сидоров // Политическая наука. – 2019. № 4. – с.16.; Зазнаев, О.И. Индексный анализ полупрезидентских государств Европы и постсоветского пространства // Полис, – 2007. № 32. – с. 146-164.; Зуйков, А.В. Эволюция института президентства Российской Федерации: / Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата юридических наук/. – Москва, 2009, – 28 с.; Меджидовна, М.Т. Зарождение и развитие института президентской власти в зарубежных странах // Вестник Адыгейского государственного университета. Серия 1: Регионоведение: философия, история, социология, юриспруденция, политология, культурология. – 2007. – Т 92. – с.3-6.; Паречина, С.Г. Институт президентства: история и современность / Под общ.

The studies of Western scholars such as V.Vile, T.Campbell, C.Eoin, C.Moellers, D.Cheever, C.Cameron, C.Slapin, M.Kanell and M.Kimel, B.Duignan, and G.Pikis are of particular importance in examining both the formation of the institution of the presidency and its characteristics as a mechanism of executive power, as well as the specific features of its application and functional manifestations in different countries of the world⁷.

The literature review demonstrates that in the existing research conducted in our country, the institution of the presidency has mainly been analyzed either within a legal-normative framework or through limited comparative approaches focusing on specific countries. However, a systematic, conceptual, and generalized theoretical framework regarding contemporary models of the presidency has not yet been developed. At the same time, in many studies the institution of the presidency is examined indirectly within the framework of the principle of the separation of powers, whereas its modeling and classification as an independent analytical category remain

ред. Е.В. Матусевича / С.Г.Паречина. – Минск: ИСПИ, – 2003. – 163 с.; Фарукшин, М.Х. Сроки президентских полномочий, или Бессрочная верховная власть // Политическая наука. – 2019. № 4. – с.240-261.; Шугарт, М.С.Президентские системы / М.С.Шугарт, Дж.М.Кэрри // Современная сравнительная политология. – Москва: Юрист, – 1997. – с. 198-246.

⁷ Vile, V.J.C. Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers / V.J.C.Vile. – Carmel: Liberty Fund Inc., – 2010. – 468 p.; Eoin, C. The new separation of powers: a theory for the modern state / C.Eoin. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, – 2009. – 302 p.; Moellers, C. The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers/ C.Mollers. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, – 2013. – 280 p.; Cheever, D.S. American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers / D.S.Cheever. – New York: Forgotten Books, – 2018. – 256 p.; Cameron, C.M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) / C.M.Cameron. – London: Routledge, – 2010. – 410 p. ; Slapin, J.B. Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union / J.B.Slapin. – Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, – 2011. – 197 p.; Kanell, M.E. Presimetrics: What the Facts Tell Us About How the Presidents Measure Up On the Issues We Care About / M.Kanell, M.Kimel. – New York: Black Dog & Leventhal, – 2010. – 304 p.; Duignan, B. The U.S. Constitution and the Separation of Powers / B.Duignan. – London: Britannica Educational Publishing, – 2018. – 339 p.; Pikis, G.M. Constitutionalism - Human Rights - Separation of Powers: The Cyprus Precedent / G.M.Pikis. - Boston: BRILL, – 2006. – 188 p.

insufficiently developed. Our research aims to fill precisely this gap by treating the institution of the presidency as a distinct theoretical object, systematically classifying its contemporary models, and presenting a unified analytical framework within the context of different political systems.

The object and subject of the research. The object of the research is the institution of the presidency as formed within the framework of the executive branch of government. The subject of the research consists of the theoretical and methodological foundations of the presidency, its functional characteristics, its forms of manifestation, and the contemporary models that emerge in the practice of different countries around the world.

The aim and objectives of the research. The purpose of this research is to conduct a systematic analysis of the contemporary models of the institution of the presidency as the executive branch of government and to identify their main characteristics and forms of manifestation. In this context, the research pursues the following objectives:

- to analyze methodological approaches to the separation of powers and the institutionalization of the executive mechanism of government;
- to examine the institution of the presidency as a mechanism of executive authority;
- to study the institution of the presidency within the context of international experience;
- to identify the characteristic features of contemporary models of the presidency;
- to investigate the development prospects of presidential models as well as their future status;
- to reveal the distinctive features of presidential governance in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Research methods. Both general logical and specialized scientific methods were comprehensively employed in the research. Through the methods of analysis and synthesis, the structural elements and functional characteristics of the institution of the presidency were examined both separately and in their interrelation,

while general theoretical conclusions were derived through induction and deduction. At the same time, the systemic and structural-functional approach made it possible to determine the place and role of the presidency within the overall political system. Through the method of comparative analysis, presidential models applied in different countries were compared, allowing the identification of their similarities and differences. In addition, political and legal texts were examined using the method of content analysis, and the obtained results were generalized in order to formulate scientific conclusions corresponding to the objectives of the research.

The main arguments presented for defense. As a result of the research, the following propositions are put forward for defense:

- The institution of the presidency in modern political systems is not merely a formal executive body but a key institutional mechanism that plays a central role in shaping and implementing state policy as well as determining the directions of governance. Even when the formal constitutional model remains the same, the actual functioning of the presidency and the real political influence of the president may vary significantly depending on institutional traditions, the structure of the political elite, and informal mechanisms of governance.

- The specific model of the presidency is shaped by the constitutional structure, political culture, party system, electoral mechanism, and the relations among the branches of power; therefore, it does not manifest itself in the same form across different countries.

- Comparative international experience demonstrates that in systems where the president enjoys party-based dominance over the parliament, the executive branch tends to become more centralized and dominant. Conversely, in other systems, a more stable balance among the branches of power is preserved.

- In systems where executive authority is centralized and the president possesses strong powers, the decision-making process tends to be more flexible and оперативе. This enables the state to respond more rapidly, particularly in situations of crisis and uncertainty. In certain cases, such institutional imbalance may

increase governance efficiency by allowing strategic initiatives to be formulated and implemented within a shorter period of time.

The scientific novelty of the research. The scientific novelty of the research can be summarized as follows:

- In contrast to the traditional approach in Azerbaijani political science, which generally examines the issue within the framework of the separation of powers, this study reconceptualizes the institution of the presidency as an independent object of analysis and systematically examines it within a modern theoretical framework.

- Instead of the indirect and limited approaches that have predominantly characterized the post-Soviet academic space, the dissertation integrates contemporary paradigms of Western political science and develops an independent and direct theoretical-methodological model for analyzing the institution of the presidency.

- Within the framework of this research, presidential institutions in democratic regimes are modeled for the first time on the basis of differences in continental political cultures, and a regional classification of these models is proposed.

The theoretical and practical significance of the research. Although the research is primarily theoretical in nature, its results are also significant from the perspective of practical scientific application. The approaches, models, and conclusions systematized within the framework of the dissertation may serve as a ready conceptual basis and a reliable reference source for future studies on the institution of the presidency. In particular, the classification of presidential models, the analysis of their functional characteristics, and the findings obtained through a comparative approach may provide methodological guidance for the development of new research in this field. At the same time, these materials may be used in higher education institutions as concrete examples and an analytical basis in the teaching of disciplines such as political institutions, public administration, and comparative politics. This, in turn, can contribute both to deepening students' theoretical knowledge and to enabling them to understand various models of governance in a clearer and more systematic manner.

Approval and application. The main scientific results of the completed dissertation have been reflected in 10 scientific works, including 4 conference materials presented at international and national conferences and 6 scientific articles published in reputable journals. The principal findings of the dissertation were presented at the following conferences:

- Models of the Institution of the Presidency in Foreign Countries // 4th International Scientific Research Symposium “29 October,” October 29–30, Turkey, 2022;

- The Institution of the Presidency: Its History, Structure, and Role in the State // Ways of Planning and Forecasting Social Development in the New Geopolitical Environment, Proceedings of the Republican Scientific-Practical Conference of Young Researchers, Part II, October 20, Baku, 2023;

- Analysis of the Institution of the Presidency in China and Iran // 7th Republican Scientific Conference of Young Researchers, March 15, Baku, 2024.

The name of the organization where the dissertation work was carried out. The dissertation work was carried out at the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Baku State University.

Structure and volume of the dissertation. The dissertation consist of an introduction (17,676 characters), Chapter I (75,126 characters), Chapter II (71,200 characters), Chapter III (83,680 characters), a conclusion (6,550 characters), and a list of references. In total, the dissertation comprises 254,232 characters, excluding the list of references.

MAIN CONTENT OF THE RESEARCH

In the “**Introduction**” section of the research, the relevance of the dissertation topic is substantiated, the object and subject of the research as well as its purpose and objectives are defined, the scientific novelty of the research and its theoretical and practical significance are determined, the provisions submitted for defense are presented, and the structure and volume of the work are briefly outlined.

The first chapter of the research is entitled “**The Institution of the Presidency as an Important Element of Government**” and consists of two paragraphs. The first paragraph, “*A Methodological Perspective on the Separation of Powers,*” states that the principle of the separation of powers initially emerged as a problem of the rational organization of public administration, and its theoretical foundations were laid in antiquity by Plato and Aristotle; this approach was later elaborated by Polybius in relation to the Roman system of governance and reinterpreted in the early Middle Ages by Marsilius of Padua within the context of the source and legitimacy of power. A more systematic and institutional framework was later developed by John Locke and further advanced by Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, who enriched it with concrete principles such as the functional differentiation of the branches of government, the distribution of powers, and the mechanism of “**checks and balances.**” This model was subsequently brought to the level of practical application in the political system of the United States by Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison.

At a later stage, the trajectory of theoretical development entered a broader philosophical and sociological framework. Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel advanced different conceptual approaches concerning the nature of power, its legitimacy, and the structure of the state; in the twentieth century, Max Weber associated executive authority with the model of rational-bureaucratic administration, Michel Foucault emphasized the micro-level mechanisms of the diffusion of power, and Alexis de Tocqueville analyzed the influence of executive authority on society within democratic systems. In the contemporary period, researchers such as Craig and Tomkins, Dyzenhaus, A. V. Dicey, Campbell, Rockman, and James Aberbach have examined the institutional structures of the executive branch, its legal constraints, and its political functionality in greater detail, thereby contributing to the formation of the institution of the presidency as an independent analytical object.

The second paragraph, in turn, examines “*The Institutionalization of the Executive Mechanism of Power.*” It is

noted that the institutionalization of executive authority is formed through structured rules, normative frameworks, and bureaucratic mechanisms that ensure the stability of the political system. Although the theoretical roots of this process extend back to Aristotle, a systematic approach emerged during the Enlightenment period. Within this framework, Max Weber's thesis "**power = legitimized force**" demonstrates that the formalization of executive authority through institutions constitutes a fundamental condition for its acceptance, while Montesquieu substantiates an institutional mechanism that prevents the excessive centralization of executive power through the principle of the separation of powers. As a result, the constitution, the legal framework, and the bureaucratic apparatus become the primary instruments through which executive authority attains stability, accountability, and legitimacy.

Executive authority is not a static institution; rather, it represents a dynamic mechanism of governance that evolves within changing political and social contexts. This characteristic distinguishes it from other branches of government. This approach is also reflected in the constitutional practices of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, where the boundaries of executive authority are not rigidly defined but are instead regulated flexibly on the basis of the doctrine of necessity and the principle of legality. This allows the executive branch to adapt to unexpected situations, while simultaneously limiting it within a legal framework.

The author also demonstrates how the theoretical foundations of executive authority have developed in a multifaceted manner within both classical and modern political thought. Aristotle presents an empirical model by linking executive authority with the rule of law and balanced governance, whereas Plato describes it as a centralized ideal model governed by a philosopher-king. Hobbes defends a strong and indivisible sovereign executive authority as a fundamental condition of social order, while Rousseau limits it as the executor of the "**general will.**" This classical line of thought is further complemented by Weber's model of rational-legal bureaucracy, Foucault's concept of "**governmentality,**" and

Tocqueville's analyses of the dual nature of executive authority in democratic systems—its potential for centralization as well as its openness to public oversight. In the contemporary period, scholars such as Craig and Tomkins, Dyzenhaus, Campbell, Rockman, and Aberbach explain the legal boundaries of executive authority, its behavior in extraordinary circumstances, and its variability depending on the political context within a concrete empirical and institutional framework.

Chapter II of the research examines **“The Institution of the Presidency and Its Contemporary Forms.”** In the first paragraph of the chapter, entitled *“The Institution of the Presidency as a Mechanism of Executive Power,”* the main argument is that the modern typology of the presidency is not limited to the classical concept of the **“presidential republic,”** but rather is formed on the basis of more complex structural differences. In this context, the principal distinguishing criterion is the degree of the president's real control over the executive branch and the nature of the president's relations with the other branches of government. Within this framework, the model of the United States is presented as a classical presidential system in which the president serves simultaneously as the head of state and the head of government. However, the president's authority is constrained by a strict mechanism of **“checks and balances”** exercised by Congress and the Supreme Court. In contrast, in Latin American countries – such as Brazil and Argentina – although the formal institutional design appears similar, differences in the president's political weight and the institutional environment result in a system that tends more strongly toward the dominance of the executive branch.

Semi-presidential models are also distinguished as a separate typology, with France serving as the most typical example. In this model, authority is divided between the president and the prime minister, and the balance within the executive branch may shift depending on the political configuration. For instance, in the French model the president possesses strong powers in foreign policy and security matters; however, when the parliamentary majority belongs to a different political camp, a situation of **“cohabitation”** emerges,

strengthening the role of the prime minister. This demonstrates that the system functions not as a rigid structure but rather in a contextual and flexible manner. This typology has also been implemented in post-Soviet and Eastern European countries such as Poland and Ukraine; however, due to institutional weaknesses and the structure of political elites, it has often resulted in the predominance of the presidency.

The author also identifies non-democratic or hybrid presidential models as a separate category, citing countries such as Russia, China, and Iran as key examples. In these systems, although the presidency formally exists within a constitutional framework, the actual distribution of power is determined through different mechanisms. In Russia during the period of V. Putin, the presidency has been characterized by a strongly centralized executive authority reinforced by dominance over the party system. In China, the presidency is combined with the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, effectively functioning as an element of a party-state synthesis. In Iran, although the president is elected, the presence of the Supreme Religious Leader creates a dual structure of executive power and significantly limits the authority of the president. This typology demonstrates that the real nature of the institution of the presidency depends not only on the legal model but also on the character of the political regime, the structure of the elite, and informal mechanisms of power.

The next paragraph is entitled ***“Presidential Governance in the Context of International Experience.”*** In this part of the research, the actual functioning mechanisms of the institution of the presidency are systematically compared primarily through the examples of the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran. This comparison demonstrates that the same institution may produce entirely different outcomes under different political regimes. In the United States, the presidency operates in a balanced manner through a strict separation of powers and institutional oversight mechanisms; in Turkey, constitutional amendments have expanded presidential executive powers, leading to a more centralized model; in Russia, the presidency is characterized by a dominant executive authority and

weak balancing mechanisms; while in China and Iran, although the presidency formally exists as an institution, real power is concentrated in alternative centers linked to party or religious leadership.

The analysis of these countries clearly shows that, in addition to the scope of presidential powers, the president's relationship with the parliament, the party system, and other structures of power is a decisive factor. In the United States, the president is institutionally separate from the legislative branch and is subject to real oversight. In Turkey, the president both directly governs the executive branch and actively influences political processes. In Russia, the president holds de facto dominance over the parliament. In China and Iran, however, presidential authority is shared with other centers of power, and for this reason the institution significantly differs from the classical presidential model.

In addition, the examples of France, Germany, and Italy are used for a shorter but functional comparison, demonstrating that in European models the presidency generally functions either as a balanced executive authority within a semi-presidential framework or as a symbolic institution with limited powers. While the French model represents a semi-presidential system in which the president possesses real political influence, in Germany and Italy the presidency is largely ceremonial and does not participate in day-to-day governance. This indicates that within the European context the institution of the presidency is not the central component of executive authority but rather serves as an additional mechanism ensuring institutional stability.

Chapter III, entitled **“Classification of Presidential Institution Models in Political Science,”** consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph, ***“Characteristic and Distinctive Features of Contemporary Models of the Institution of the Presidency,”*** argues that the classification of presidential models is not a simple legal division but rather a multidimensional analytical framework in which several parallel criteria operate simultaneously. Within the study, these criteria are systematized into six main blocks: according to the nature of executive authority – the strong executive

model and the symbolic ceremonial model; according to relations with the legislative body – the presidential system and the parliamentary system; according to the party system – single-party dominance and multiparty coalitions; according to tenure – fixed terms and term limitations; according to oversight mechanisms – strong audit and limited audit; and according to the method of election – direct and indirect election. It is particularly emphasized that these criteria operate not independently but in interaction with one another. For example, the strong executive model is often accompanied by limited oversight, broad veto powers, control over key appointments, and the ability to respond rapidly to crises, whereas the ceremonial model is characterized by symbolic representation, diplomatic visibility, the function of national unity, and dependence on other branches of government in decision-making. Similarly, while the presidential system creates a fixed term, separate legitimacy, and rigid boundaries between the executive and legislative branches, the parliamentary model is distinguished by the emergence of the head of government from the legislative majority, the possibility of removal through a vote of no confidence, and the fusion of executive and legislative powers.

The author also proposes an ideological typology of presidential models, identifying four main types: the liberal-democratic model, the social-democratic model, the authoritarian or strong executive model, and the conservative presidential model. The liberal-democratic model is characterized by regular and direct elections, separation of powers, strong checks and balances, respect for the rule of law, and the protection of individual rights and civil liberties, and its theoretical foundations are associated with John Locke, Montesquieu, and John Stuart Mill. The social-democratic model seeks to establish a balance between a market-oriented economy and welfare policies, aiming to reduce economic inequality and ensure a more equitable distribution of resources; in this regard, the intellectual traditions of John Rawls and Karl Polanyi are identified as its principal theoretical foundations. The authoritarian or strong executive model is characterized by an emphasis on stability, speed in governance, centralized decision-making, and limited

oversight mechanisms, with its theoretical foundations linked to the realist tradition and particularly to Thomas Hobbes's idea of strong authority. The conservative model, in contrast, emphasizes tradition, social order, limited government intervention, and a free market economy; here the influence of thinkers such as Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek is clearly highlighted. The central argument is that these four models do not merely describe practical political systems but also demonstrate how different normative worldviews acquire institutional form within the institution of the presidency.

The classification of presidential models cannot rely solely on formal constitutional texts, since their actual functioning is shaped by cultural context, informal institutions, party systems, coalition politics, and global influences. From this perspective, the author employs the analytical tools of institutionalism, principal-agent theory, constitutionalism, party system theories, and approaches to coalition politics, as well as liberal, realist, and constructivist theories of international relations. The study demonstrates that the type of presidential model depends not only on the formal powers of the president but also on the party system within which the president operates, the effectiveness of mechanisms such as veto and impeachment, the method of election, the presence or absence of term limits, and the pressures of the global environment. For example, single-party dominance may create stability and a unified political agenda, yet it also increases the risks of limited oversight and authoritarian tendencies. In contrast, multiparty coalitions may enhance inclusiveness and broader representation, but they can also slow decision-making and lead to prolonged negotiations. Similarly, fixed terms provide political continuity and the opportunity for long-term planning, but they also carry the risk of prolonging unpopular leadership. Term limits, on the other hand, serve the function of democratic renewal and help prevent the personalization of power. The concluding thesis of this paragraph is that the classification of presidential models represents a complex analytical mechanism used to understand not only the legal framework of political systems but also their actual logic of governance, the distribution of power, and their ideological foundations.

The second paragraph of Chapter III is entitled ***“Development Prospects and the Future Status of Presidential Models.”*** It notes that in the near future the development of the institution of the presidency is likely to occur globally not primarily within a democratic-liberal framework but rather against the background of strengthening authoritarian-conservative tendencies. This trend directs the structure of the presidency in many countries toward more centralized forms. The research identifies several key factors behind this shift, including intensifying geopolitical competition among major powers, economic inequality and social discontent, the spread of digital surveillance technologies, the growth of disinformation, and the rise of populist politics. As a result, under the slogans of strong leadership and stability, tendencies such as the emergence of personality cults around the presidency, the expansion of executive powers justified by emergency situations, and the weakening of legislative and judicial oversight are becoming more pronounced. Within this broader framework, particular attention is given to several country-specific developments. In the United States, the example of Donald Trump illustrates tendencies to expand the boundaries of executive authority. In Turkey, during the period of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – especially following the constitutional changes that took effect in 2018 – the presidency has been strengthened at the expense of parliamentary and judicial oversight. In Russia, under Vladimir Putin, the presidency has become further consolidated around narratives of national security, war, and nationalism. According to the author, in these cases the future trajectory of the presidency appears to move less toward democratic renewal and more toward the consolidation of executive power.

Distinct development trajectories are identified for specific regions and countries, demonstrating that the future of the presidency will not evolve according to a single universal model but rather along different paths corresponding to the character of political regimes. For Turkey, the author’s main forecast is that electoral victories, potential referendums, and constitutional amendments may further expand presidential powers; this could both strengthen centralized governance and increase the risks of social polarization and

institutional weakening. For Russia, two scenarios are outlined: victory in Ukraine would likely further centralize Putin's presidency, reinforce nationalist legitimacy, and deepen repressive policies, whereas defeat or a departure from power would place the institution of the presidency in a situation of uncertain transition, potential fragmentation within the elite, and limited opportunities for democratic liberalization. With regard to China, the author notes that, unlike the relatively collective and constrained governance model of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao periods, during the Xi Jinping era the presidency has become the central locus where power within the party and the state converges. This new model has been accompanied by the removal of term limits, political purges conducted under the banner of anti-corruption campaigns, and the suppression of opposition. Although this model may provide short-term efficiency and policy continuity, in the long term it generates problems such as the absence of institutional oversight, an increased risk of political miscalculation, and the deepening of social tensions. Iran is not examined through an extensive future scenario in this paragraph; however, the general logic suggests that the future of the elected presidency will remain constrained within the framework of supreme religious and institutional oversight.

The author systematizes the broader conclusions for Latin America, Europe, and the global landscape, demonstrating that the future of the presidency will develop in accordance with different institutional realities in each region. For Latin America, a dual dynamic is emphasized: on the one hand, efforts toward regular elections, peaceful transfers of power, and the strengthening of democratic institutions continue; on the other hand, poverty, inequality, corruption, and populism create conditions that may foster the authoritarianization of the presidency. The election of J. Milei in Argentina is presented as a concrete example illustrating how the presidency may move toward a more confrontational and centralizing direction capable of destabilizing the existing political order. For Europe, the author does not present a single presidential trajectory. Instead, it is argued that both strong executive presidencies and symbolic presidencies coexist on the continent.

However, in countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, and partly Poland – where political developments demonstrate orientations closer to the Russian and Turkish models – there is a possibility of increasing tendencies toward presidential forms of governance. This indicates a potential institutional shift from parliamentary systems toward a strengthening of executive authority. The concluding argument of the paragraph is that in the United States the presidency will remain a strong yet balanced central institution; in Russia and Turkey it will become an even more consolidated pillar of executive authority; in China the process of centralization will continue; and in Latin America a mixed trajectory will prevail, varying from country to country and combining both democratic and populist-authoritarian possibilities. Overall, the broader picture suggests that the future of the institution of the presidency will be shaped by the global struggle between democratic-liberal and authoritarian-conservative forces.

The final paragraph of Chapter III, as well as of the entire research, entitled *“Presidential Governance in the Republic of Azerbaijan: Identical and Distinctive Features,”* demonstrates that the institution of the presidency in Azerbaijan did not emerge as a mechanical application of classical theoretical models but rather as a functional necessity formed under conditions of a specific historical and political crisis. Its initial purpose was to fill the governance vacuum, restore stability, and ensure state sovereignty. The establishment of the presidential office in 1990–1991 occurred against the backdrop of the collapse of the Soviet system of governance, the breakdown of legal oversight, the weakening of public order, and the institutional fragility of executive authority. In this regard, the creation of the presidency was the direct result of the need for a centralized decision-making mechanism. From this perspective, the emergence of the presidential institution was not merely a constitutional change but also a response to broader problems such as the weakness of political culture, legal nihilism, and the lack of public trust in state institutions. It is specifically emphasized that the president was expected both to perform an arbitral function within domestic governance and to ensure the unified representation of the state at the international level, which

made the strengthening of executive authority structurally inevitable during the initial stage of state-building in Azerbaijan.

The constitutional structure and functional mechanisms of Azerbaijan's presidential model are analyzed in detail, and the central thesis is that the president acts as a unified center serving simultaneously as the head of state and the head of the executive branch. However, this does not formally negate the principle of the separation of powers but rather represents its specific interpretation. According to Articles 7 and 8 of the 1995 Constitution, legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separate; nevertheless, the fact that executive authority belongs to the president grants him extensive powers, including the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, the appointment of vice-presidents, the approval and return of laws, appeals to the Constitutional Court, the conduct of foreign policy, and the leadership of the armed forces. At the same time, the mechanism of presidential decrees and orders is presented as a key instrument that clarifies the application of laws, fills legal gaps, and accelerates decision-making. It is particularly emphasized that the decree mechanism does not replace legislation but rather operationalizes it and ensures its practical implementation, which constitutes one of the distinguishing features of the Azerbaijani model.

The research also explains the transformation of the institution of the presidency in the contemporary period and its actual political weight within the Azerbaijani political system through specific events and reforms. The main argument is that this institution functions not only as a legal mechanism but is also closely connected with leadership, legitimacy, and national mobilization. Constitutional amendments adopted in 2002, 2009, and 2016 – particularly the creation of the institution of the vice-presidency – were intended to increase the flexibility of governance and to make the executive structure more functional. At the same time, the 44-day war of 2020 significantly increased the actual political weight of the presidency, elevating this institution beyond a governance instrument to the level of a symbol of national victory and state strength. It is specifically noted that Ilham Aliyev's ability during the war to ensure оперативне

decision-making, coordinate military and political actions, and conduct international diplomacy simultaneously serves as practical evidence of the effectiveness of the presidential institution. As a result, the Azerbaijani model is characterized as a hybrid form in which charismatic leadership is combined with rational-institutional governance.

The general **conclusion** of the research is that the institution of the presidency in modern political systems is not merely a formal executive body but one of the central institutions responsible for shaping state policy, directing governance, and organizing political power. Presidential models do not operate according to a single universal scheme; their formation is conditioned by constitutional arrangements, electoral mechanisms, political culture, party systems, checks and balances, as well as historical and regional characteristics. While in the United States the presidency functions as a more balanced model surrounded by institutional constraints, in the cases of Russia, Turkey, and China the centralization of executive authority appears more pronounced. In Iran, although the presidency is formally elected, real power is concentrated in a religious-political center. In the case of Azerbaijan, the institution of the presidency is also based on a centralized governance model and is presented as the principal mechanism that creates a direct link between the formulation and implementation of state programs. In order to understand the real nature of the presidency, it is therefore necessary to examine not only its legal form but also its actual operational mechanisms, the political environment, and the relationships among institutions.

List of published scientific works related to the topic of the dissertation:

1. Models of the Presidential Institution in Foreign Countries // Turkey: IV International 29 October Scientific Research Symposium, – 29 October, – 2022, – pp. 41-46.
2. The Presidential Institution in Latin America // – Baku: Geostrategiya, International Socio-Political, Scientific-Theoretical Journal, – 2023. No. 5(77), – pp. 40-43.
3. The Institution of Presidential Power in the USA // - Sumgayit: Scientific News, Department of Social and Humanitarian Sciences, – 2023. No. 3, – pp. 56-61.
4. The Institution of Presidency: History, Structure, and Its Role in the State // – Baku: Ways of Planning and Forecasting Social Development in the New Geopolitical Environment, Materials of the Republican Scientific-Practical Conference of Young Researchers, Part II, – 2023. - pp. 158-163.
5. Methodological foundations of the concept of governance region // – Odessa: АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ ФІЛОСОФІЇ ТА СОЦІОЛОГІЇ, – 2023. Випуск 45, – с. 144-150.
6. The Executive Function of Power: The Presidency as an Institutional Mechanism // – Baku: Geostrategiya, – 2024. No. 1(79), – pp. 37-41.
7. An Analysis of the Presidency Institution in China and Iran // – Baku: VII Republican Scientific Conference of Young Researchers, – March 15, – 2024, – pp. 236-238.
8. The Problem of Institutionalization of the Executive Power // – Baku: History and Its Issues, – 2024. No. 1, – pp. 181-185.
9. Analysis of the Future of the Institution of Presidency // – Baku: History and Its Problems, – 2024. No. 4, – pp. 200-204.
10. Analysis of the Institution of Presidency in the Experience of World Countries // – Sumgayit: Scientific News of Sumgayit State University, – 2024. No. 4, – pp. 65-69.



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